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A TYPOLOGY AND CRITIQUE OF
TITLE IX SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW
AFTER GEBSER AND DAvIs*
WILLIAM A. KAPLIN**
I. INTRODUCTION
Sexual harassment is not a new phenomenon. It has long been with us in
our workplaces, in our educational institutions, and in other sectors of soci-
ety, but the public awareness of sexual harassment, and its acknowledgment
as an endemic problem, is relatively new. Only since the mid-1970's has sex-
ual harassment been emerging from private shadows into the public light. As
one commentator recently summed up, "[w]e finally have acknowledged the
problem, but we are a considerable distance from solving it."1
This article addresses the recent history and current status of the sexual
harassment problem in colleges and universities, focusing particularly on the
harassment of students by their teachers or by their peers. Special attention
will be given to whether and how students may hold colleges and universities
liable in court for money damages for a failure to protect them from harass-
ment. Then, using such private causes of action by students as the center-
piece, this article will develop a typology of Title IX sexual harassment claims
and of the variable contexts in which they may arise. Following the typology,
the article will consider the implications for colleges and universities and of-
fer some recommendations for managing them.
Various surveys and studies have confirmed the prevalence of sexual har-
assment in the nation's educational institutions. A 1993 study by the Ameri-
can Association of University Women (AAUW), for instance, found that
81% of students in grades eight through eleven had been the target of some
form of sexual harassment in school. Of these students, 25% reported being
harassed "often." The harassers were both school employees and other stu-
dents, with 79% of the harassers being students.2 In another study four years
later, the National Coalition for Women and Girls in Education relied on the
AAUW data and other studies to conclude that "sexual harassment in school
is a barrier of imposing proportions to girls and women trying to move ahead,
affecting female students in educational institutions ranging from elementary
* Copyright © 2000 by William A. Kaplin; all rights reserved. Portions of this article
are adapted from the author's work on the manuscript for William Kaplin & Barbara Lee,
YEAR 2000 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LAW OF HIGHER EDUCATION 3D ED. (Nat'l Ass'n of
College & Univ. Attorneys, 2000), and from a public lecture the author presented in
February 2000 as part of the Stetson University College of Law's Distinguished Lecture
Series.
** Professor of Law and Special Counsel, The Catholic University of America.
1. Deborah Rhode, Sex Harassment Remains a Problem in Schools, NAT'L LAW
JOURNAL, Oct. 5, 1998, at A25.
2. AAUW EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION, HOSTILE HALLWAYS: THE AAUW SUR-
VEY ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN AMERICA'S SCHOOLS (1993).
616 JOURNAL OF COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY LAW
schools to post-graduate schools."'3 This study went beyond the AAUW
study to cover higher education as well as elementary/secondary education.
The higher education statistics, according to the National Coalition, "indicate
that ... approximately 30 percent of undergraduates and 40 percent of gradu-
ate students had experienced some form of sexual harassment, with student-
to-student sexual harassment being the most common occurrence by far -
about 90% of students [reporting harassment] experienced this form of har-
assment."'4 The National Coalition's study also included a "report card"
grading the nation's efforts, over the prior twenty-five years, to establish
"gender equity in education in nine key areas."' 5 Sexual harassment, as one
of the nine areas, was assigned the lowest grade of any area, a "D+."
Why have our society and our courts become concerned with sexual har-
assment? The data tell part of the story. The gradual realization that sexual
harassment is indeed a form of sex discrimination, and that it deserves the
same attention and disapproval, tells part of the story. The difficulties of
resolving the problem, as demonstrated by the slow and limited progress thus
far, tell another part. Yet another part is the delicate balance of the victim's
rights with both the accused harasser's and the institution's interests in pri-
vacy and academic freedom.6 Perhaps most basic, we have come to recognize
the serious harm that can befall the victims of harassment. As one study
summarized, sexual harassment "devastates one's physical well-being, emo-
tional health, and vocational development."'7
For many years, it was unclear whether students suffering such harm could
ever hold their institutions liable for failing to take reasonable steps to pro-
tect them from harassment. In 1964, using its commerce power,8 Congress
enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 9 prohibiting employers
from discriminating against employees based on sex. When enacted, how-
ever, Title VII neither applied to students nor expressly recognized sexual
harassment as a form of sex discrimination. In 1972, using its spending
3. NATIONAL COALITION FOR WOMEN AND GIRLS IN EDUCATION, TITLE IX AT 25:
REPORT CARD ON GENDER EouITy: A REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COALITION FOR WO-
MEN AND GIRLS IN EDUCATION, 31 (1997) [hereinafter REPORT CARD].
4. Id. at 33. See also Anne Lawton, The Emperor's New Clothes: How the Academy
Deals With Sexual Harassment, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 75, 79 n.18, 82 n.39 (1999).
5. See REPORT CARD, supra note 3 at 4.
6. See, e.g., WILLIAM KAPLIN & BARBARA LEE, THE LAW OF HIGHER EDUCATION
§ 3.7.2 (3d ed. Supp. 2000) [hereinafter Supp. 2000].
7. MICHELE A. PALUDI & RICHARD B. BARICKMAN, ACADEMIC AND WORKPLACE
SEXUAL HARASSMENT: A RESOURCE MANUAL 27 (1991). See also ROBERT SHOOP &
DEBRA EDWARDS, HOW TO STOP SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN OUR SCHOOLS: A HANDBOOK
AND CURRICULUM GUIDE FOR ADMINISTRATORS AND TEACHERS 53-66 (1994).
8. See generally WILLIAM KAPLIN & BARBARA LEE, THE LAW OF HIGHER EDUCA-
TION § 7.1.3 (3d ed. 1995) [hereinafter LHE 3d].
9. 42 U.S.C. §8 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994); see generally Kaplin & Lee, LHE 3d, supra
note 8, §§ 3.3.2.1, 3.3.4.3. In 1972, using its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power
along with its commerce power, Congress extended the Title VII prohibition to state and
local employers. See Kaplin & Lee, LHE 3d, supra note 8, § 7.1.4.
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power,10 Congress enacted Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972,11
making non-discrimination by sex a condition of participation in federally
funded education programs. Although Title IX did apply to discrimination
against students, like Title VII, it did not by its terms recognize sexual harass-
ment as a form of sex discrimination.
In the mid-1970's, courts began to recognize sexual harassment claims
under Title VII, but these precedents were limited to the workplace. In 1977,
in the case of Alexander v. Yale University,12 one court did acknowledge that
students' harassment claims could be actionable under Title IX, but this ac-
knowledgment was limited to quid pro quo harassment, the narrower form of
harassment that occurs when education benefits are conditioned on the stu-
dent's submission to sexual demands. While sexual harassment law contin-
ued to grow through the 1980's, almost all the developments - except for
some administrative activity within the U.S. Department of Education's Of-
fice for Civil Rights - were in the arena of workplace harassment.
Finally, in 1992, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Franklin v. Gwinnett
County Public Schools,13 holding that a student who was harassed by a
teacher could sue the school district for money damages under Title IX.
Franklin clearly established that sexual harassment - even the broader type,
hostile environment harassment - constituted sex discrimination under Title
IX, but the case did not definitively establish a standard of liability for deter-
mining when a school district or other educational institution would be liable
in money damages for harassment perpetrated by its teachers and other em-
ployees. Moreover, since Franklin was a case regarding harassment by a
teacher, it did not address issues concerning an educational institution's po-
tential liability for peer harassment - one student's sexual harassment of
another student.14
Both types of liability questions, however, were extensively discussed in
the lower courts after the Franklin case. No pattern emerged; different
courts took vastly different approaches in determining when liability would
accrue to an educational institution for the actions of its teachers, employees,
or students. At one extreme, some courts determined that an educational
institution could be vicariously liable on the basis of common law agency
principles of respondeat superior.15 At the other extreme, some courts deter-
10. See generally Kaplin & Lee, LHE 3d, supra note 8, § 7.1.1. In more recent cases,
courts have asserted that Title IX is also based on Congress's power to enforce the Four-
teenth Amendment. See, e.g., Crawford v. Davis, 109 F.3d 1281 (8th Cir. 1997), discussed
in text accompanying notes 66-67, infra.
11. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1994); see generally Kaplin & Lee, LHE 3d, supra note 8,
§ 7.5.3.
12. 459 F. Supp. 1 (D. Conn. 1977), affd, 631 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1980).
13. 503 U.S. 60 (1992). See generally Kaplin & Lee, supra note 8, §§ 7.5.3, 7.5.9.
14. For a more comprehensive version of sexual harassment law's history from 1964
to 1992, see Jan Alan Neiger, Actual Knowledge Under Gebser v. Lago Vista: Evidence of
the Court's Deliberate Indifference or an Appropriate Response for Finding Institutional
Liability? 26 J.C & U.L. 1, 7-10, 16-17, 18-19 n.114, 21-24 (1999).
15. See, e.g., Kracunas and Pallett v. Iona College, 119 F.3d 80 (2d Cir. 1997) (faculty
harassment).
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mined that an educational institution could be liable only if it treated com-
plaints of female students differently from those of male students 16 or that it
should not be liable at all.17 In between the extremes, other courts held that
an educational institution could be liable under a constructive notice, or
"knew or should have known," standard' 8 or that an institution could be lia-
ble only in certain narrow circumstances where it had knowledge of the har-
assment and failed to respond.19
The U.S. Department of Education also addressed these liability issues in
the wake of Franklin. In 1997, the Department's Office for Civil Rights
(OCR) published its Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by
School Employees, Other Students, or Third Parties.2 0 The Guidance provides
that liability for harassment by teachers or other school employees of a
school or college is governed by agency principles:
A school will.., be liable for hostile environment sexual harassment by
its employees ... if the employee - (1) acted with apparent authority
(i.e., because of the school's conduct, the employee reasonably appears
to be acting on behalf of the school, whether or not the employee acted
with authority); or (2) was aided in carrying out the sexual harassment
of students by his or her position of authority with the institution.2 1
For example, if the school employee had the authority to discipline a student
or to evaluate the student's academic performance, a student might believe
that the employee was acting under the school's authority, and the school
could be liable for the harassment even if it had not been reported to school
officials.
Regarding peer sexual harassment, the Guidance takes a somewhat differ-
ent approach based upon a "knew or should have known" standard:
[A] school will be liable under Title IX if its students sexually harass
other students, if (i) a hostile environment exists in the school's pro-
grams or activities, (ii) the school knows or should have known of the
harassment, and (iii) the school fails to take immediate and appropriate
corrective action.22
16. See, e.g., Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir. 1996) (peer
harassment).
17. See, e.g., Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390 (11th Cir. 1997) (en
banc) (peer harassment).
18. See, e.g., Doe v. Petaluma Sch. Dist., 949 F. Supp. 1415 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (peer
harassment).
19. See, e.g., Rosa H. v. San Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 648 (5th Cir. 1997)
(faculty harassment); Doe v. University of Illinois, 138 F.3d 653 (7th Cir. 1998) (peer har-
assment). For a more extensive discussion of the Title IX sexual harassment cases between
Franklin and Gebser, see Neiger, supra note 14, at 27-33.
20. 62 Fed. Reg. 12,039 (1997) available at http://www.ed.gov/offices/OCR/ocrpubs.
html [hereinafter Sexual Harassment Guidance].
21. Id.
22. Id.
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The Guidance also addresses how a school or college may avoid Title IX
liability for peer harassment:
[I]f, upon notice of hostile environment harassment, a school takes im-
mediate and appropriate steps to remedy the hostile environment, the
school has avoided violating Title IX .... Title IX does not make a
school responsible for the actions of harassing students, but rather for
its own discrimination in failing to remedy it once the school has
notice. 23
The U.S. Supreme Court has now resolved the disagreements among the
courts on liability principles for Title IX sexual harassment cases and, in the
process, has declined to adopt the standards in the Department of Educa-
tion's Guidance. In Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District,24 the
Court considered an educational institution's liability for a faculty member's
harassment of a student. One year later, in Davis v. Monroe County Board
of Education,25 the Court addressed an educational institution's liability for
peer sexual harassment.
The student in the Gebser case, Alida Star Gebser, was beginning the
ninth grade when the harassment began that led to her lawsuit. The teacher,
Mr. W., led a book discussion group that Star joined. During group sessions,
Mr. W. often made sexually suggestive comments to the students. Gebser
was then assigned to a class taught by this same teacher and discovered that
he made sexual comments in his classes as well. During the fall, Mr. W. be-
gan directing these comments specifically to Gebser. In the spring, he initi-
ated sexual contact with her, including kissing and fondling, and eventually
had sexual intercourse with her on numerous occasions over the next year.
Gebser did not report the teacher's behavior to school officials. She claimed
in the lawsuit that she realized the conduct was improper but was confused
about how to react to Mr. W's advances; she also wanted to keep him as her
teacher. The relationship continued until a police officer observed the two
engaging in sexual intercourse and arrested Mr. W.26
The student in the Davis case, LaShonda D., was in the fifth grade when
her alleged harassment began. She was not harassed by a teacher but by a
peer - a male fifth grader known by his initials, G.F. According to the alle-
gations later made in the lawsuit, G.F. sat next to LaShonda in class. She
complained that he frequently tried to grab her breasts and genital area and
that he made sexual comments to her such as "I want to get in bed with you."
LaShonda reported these incidents, and similar occurrences in physical edu-
cation class, to her mother and to her teachers. LaShonda's mother also
complained to the teachers and the principal. The school took no corrective
action. G.F.'s behavior continued over the course of five months, while
LaShonda's previously high grades dropped and she became suicidal. The
23. Id. at 12,039-40.
24. 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
25. 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
26. See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 278.
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conduct did not stop until G.F. was charged with and pled guilty to sexual
battery.27
Both Gebser and Davis proceeded through the courts as implied private
causes of action in which the plaintiffs sought money damages against the
school districts. In Gebser, the Supreme Court eventually rejected the stu-
dent's claim, holding that the school district was not liable for damages under
the facts of the case. In Davis, the Supreme Court eventually remanded the
student's claim to the district court for trial, holding that the allegations, if
proven, would subject the school district to money damages liability.
The Court decided both cases by a narrow five to four vote. Justice
O'Connor authored both majority opinions. The Justices that joined her in
Gebser, however, dissented in Davis, and those that had dissented in Gebser
joined her in Davis. Both cases adopt variants of the actual notice approach
to liability. Although both cases involved elementary/secondary education,
the Title IX principles developed in the majority opinions apply to higher
education as well.
II. THE GEBSER CASE: FACULTY/STUDENT SEXUAL HARASSMENT
In the Gebser case, the Court determined the extent to which "a school
district may be held liable in damages in an implied right of action under
Title IX . . . for the sexual harassment of a student by one of the district's
teachers. '28 In a five to four decision, the Court majority held that Title IX
damages liability is based neither on common law agency principles of re-
spondeat superior nor upon principles of constructive notice. Distinguishing
Title IX from Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,29 which does utilize
such principles, the Court insisted that "it would 'frustrate the purposes' of
Title IX to permit a damages recovery against a school district for a teacher's
sexual harassment of a student based on principles of respondeat superior or
constructive notice, i.e., without actual notice to a school district official. '30
Instead, the Court held that students may not recover damages from a school
district under Title IX for teacher-student sexual harassment "unless an offi-
cial [of the district] who at a minimum has authority to address the alleged
discrimination and to institute corrective measures on the [district's] behalf
has actual knowledge of discrimination . . . and fails adequately to re-
spond. ' 31 Moreover:
[The official's response] must amount to deliberate indifference to dis-
crimination. The administrative enforcement scheme presupposes that
an official who is advised of a Title IX violation refuses to take action to
bring the recipient into compliance. The premise, in other words, is an
official decision by the recipient not to remedy the violation. That
framework finds a rough parallel in the standard of deliberate indiffer-
27. These allegations are taken from Davis, 526 U.S. at 632-34.
28. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 277.
29. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994).
30. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 274.
31. Id. at 290.
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ence. Under a lower standard, there would be a risk that the recipient
would be liable in damages not for its own official decision but instead
for its employees' independent actions.32
Putting aside the U.S. Department of Education's Sexual Harassment Gui-
dance that had applied agency principles to teacher-student sexual harass-
ment,33 the Court made clear that it would listen only to Congress, and not to
the Department of Education, on these questions: "[u]ntil Congress speaks
directly on the subject, however, we will not hold a school district liable in
damages under Title IX for a teacher's sexual harassment of a student absent
actual notice and deliberate indifference. '34 In so doing, and in contrast with
its methodology in other situations, the Court refused to accord any defer-
ence to the decisions of the administrative agency authorized to implement
the statute.35
Applying its new liability principles to the student's claim, the Supreme
Court determined that the student had not met the standards. The Court,
therefore, affirmed the lower court's award of summary judgment to the
school district. Remarkably, the Court reached this decision even though it
acknowledged that the school district had not implemented any sexual har-
assment policy or grievance procedure:
Petitioners focus primarily on Lago Vista's asserted failure to promul-
gate and publicize an effective policy and grievance procedure for sex-
ual harassment claims. They point to Department of Education
regulations requiring each funding recipient to "adopt and publish
grievance procedures providing for prompt and equitable resolution" of
discrimination complaints, 34 C.F.R. § 106.8(b) (1997).... Lago Vista's
alleged failure to comply with the regulations, however, does not estab-
lish the requisite actual notice and deliberate indifference. And in any
event, the failure to promulgate a grievance procedure does not itself
constitute "discrimination" under Title IX.36
In effect, the Court has insisted on a standard of actual notice, while at the
same time tacitly admitting that the school district had not provided students
directions or channels for giving that notice, and has insisted on a standard of
32. Id. at 290-91.
33. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
34. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 292-93.
35. See id. at 300 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The leading U.S. Supreme Court cases on
judicial deference to an administrative agency's interpretation of the statute it administers,
and its own regulations, are Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 499
U.S. 144, 150 (1991), and Chevron, US.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S.
837, 843-845 (1984), both of which prescribe considerable deference to agency interpreta-
tions. These cases have often been cited in lower courts as the basis for deferring to U.S.
Department of Education interpretations of Title IX and the Department's implementing
regulations. See, e.g., Neal v. Board of Trustees of the Cal. State Univs., 198 F.3d 763, 770-
71 (9th Cir. 1999).
36. See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 291-92.
2000]
622 JOURNAL OF COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY LAW
deliberate indifference, while at the same time declining to consider lack of a
harassment policy and grievance procedure as evidence of that indifference.
Four justices vigorously dissented from the majority's holdings in Gebser.
Point by point, the dissenting justices rebutted the majority's reasons for re-
jecting the application of agency principles under Title IX and for concluding
that Title IX is based upon a different model of liability than Title VII. In
addition, the dissenting justices provided an extended argument to the effect
that the refusal to provide meaningful. protection for students subjected to
harassment flies in the face of the purpose and meaning of Title IX. Accord-
ing to Justice Stevens:
Congress included the prohibition against discrimination on the basis of
sex in Title IX: to induce school boards to adopt and enforce practices
that will minimize the danger that vulnerable students will be exposed
to such odious behavior. The rule that the Court has crafted creates the
opposite incentive. As long as school boards can insulate themselves
from knowledge about this sort of conduct, they can claim immunity
from damages liability. Indeed, the rule that the Court adopts would
preclude a damages remedy even if every teacher at the school knew
about the harassment but did not have "authority to institute corrective
measures on the district's behalf."...
•.. As a matter of policy, the Court ranks protection of the school
district's purse above the protection of immature high school students
.... Because those students are members of the class for whose special
benefit Congress enacted Title IX, that policy choice is not faithful to
the intent of the policymaking branch of our Government.
37
The Gebser case establishes a three-part standard for determining institu-
tional liability in damages for a teacher's sexual harassment of a student: (1)
an official of the school district must have had "actual knowledge" of the
harassment; (2) this official must have authority to "institute corrective mea-
sures" to resolve the harassment problem; and (3) this official must have
"fail[ed] to adequately respond" to the harassment and, in failing to respond,
must have acted with "deliberate indifference. '38
This Gebser liability standard will be difficult for potential plaintiffs to
meet and, in practice, will provide scant opportunity for successful Title IX
damages actions against educational institutions. The first element of the
standard, actual notice, will be very difficult to meet in many cases since insti-
tutions will be able to "insulate themselves" from this knowledge in various
ways.
37. See id. at 300, 306 (Stevens, J. dissenting); see also id. at 293-306 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
38. Id. at 300. The Gebser standards may also be applicable to student-student har-
assment in certain narrow circumstances where the institution has granted a student some
kind of authority over other students. See infra notes 87-88 and accompanying text (cate-
gory 5).
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The second element will present difficulties in determining which officials
or employees of educational institutions have authority to take corrective ac-
tion. In Liu v. Striuli,39 for example, the court determined that neither the
director of financial aid nor the director of the graduate history department
was an. official with authority to correct the alleged harassment of a graduate
student because neither official had "supervisory authority" over the alleged
harasser. Such difficulties will be substantially compounded by the Gebser
decision's addition of the third "deliberate indifference" element to the other
two elements. In Wills v. Brown University,40 for instance, the court upheld
the inadmissibility of evidence concerning the university's responses to inci-
dents of harassment, perpetrated by the same professor, both before and af-
ter the plaintiff-student's harassment, thus leaving the plaintiff no basis for
proving deliberate difference.
In these respects, the Gebser test stands in stark contrast to the liability
standards under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In two recent cases
decided in the same term as the Gebser case, Faragher v. City of Boca Raton41
and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,42 the U.S. Supreme Court deter-
mined that liability for sexual harassment under Title VII is based upon
agency principles and a respondeat superior model of liability. Thus, under
Title VII but not under Title IX, an employer may be liable in damages for a
supervisor's acts of harassment even though the employer did not have actual
knowledge, or constructive notice, of the harassment. To put the matter an-
other way, employees have much more protection against harassment under
Title VII than students have under Title IX.
From the standpoint of public policy and Congressional purpose, it is not
clear why there should be such divergent outcomes under the two statutes or
why supervisor-employee relationships should be treated so differently from
teacher-student relationships. Students, in general, are younger than em-
ployees and have less worldly experience; therefore, they may be even more
vulnerable to harassment than employees. The academic environment may
encourage students to place more trust in their teachers than employees
place in their supervisors in the work environment.43 Moreover teachers may
exercise "even greater authority and control over [their] students than ....
supervisors exercise over their employees." 44
39. 36 F. Supp. 2d 452 (D.R.I. 1999).
40. 184 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 1999). Compare Chantos v. Rhea, 29 F. Supp. 2d 931, 934-38
(N.D. Ill. 1998).
41. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
42. 524 U.S. 742 (1998). Faragher and Ellerth have been implemented by the EEOC
in a comprehensive guidance that covers not only sex harassment but also race, national
origin, age, and disability harassment. Available at http://www.eeoc.gov/docslharassment.
html (last modified June 21, 1999).
43. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Sex Harassment Remains a Problem in Schools,
NAT'L L.J., Oct. 5, 1998, at A25; Ronna Schneider, Sexual Harassment and Higher Educa-
tion, 65 TEX. L. REv. 525, 550-53 (1987).
44. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 299 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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The Court justified these divergent outcomes under Title IX and Title VII
on the basis of conceptual and structural differences between the two stat-
utes.45 Title IX, as a conditional spending statute, is based on a different
legislative model than Title VII, a regulatory statute.46 The two statutes
therefore have different statutory phraseology, different enforcement mecha-
nisms, and different legislative histories. Courts interpreting and applying
Title IX need not be bound by Title VII judicial precedents and administra-
tive guidelines.
It does not follow from these differences, however, that there must be a
drastic difference in liability standards under the two statutes.47 In particular,
nothing about these acknowledged differences between Title IX and Title
VII undermines the basic point made above - that in terms of public policy
and statutory purposes (and, it might be added, common sense) it is unlikely
that Congress would have contemplated or intentionally provided for such a
divergence between the protections for students and the protections for em-
ployees. Even the Court itself, in the Franklin case48 that preceded Gebser,
recognized a clear parallel between Title IX and Title VII with respect to
sexual harassment. Relying on its Title VII decision in Meritor,49 the Court
in Franklin asserted that:
Unquestionably, Title IX placed on [school districts] the duty not to
discriminate on the basis of sex, and "when a supervisor sexually ha-
rasses a subordinate because of the subordinate's sex, that supervisor
'discriminates' on the basis of sex." Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson,
45. See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 286-87; see also Neiger, supra note 14, at 39-47. Compare
Gebser, 524 U.S. at 297 n.5 and accompanying text and at 298-99 n.9 and accompanying
text (Stevens, J., dissenting); compare Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, Civil Rights
Without Remedies: Vicarious Liability Under Title VII, Section 1983, and Title IX, 7 WM. &
MARY BILL RmS J. 755, 778-81, 791-94 (1999) (analyzing and criticizing the Court's distinc-
tion between Title IX and Title VII).
46. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
47. Perhaps the Court had in mind some other difference between the statutes con-
cerning the requirement of discriminatory intent. In a Title IX private cause of action, no
money damages can be awarded the plaintiff unless the defendant intentionally discrimi-
nated by sex. Cf. Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service Com'n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983). Some
commentators have argued that "actual knowledge" must be the liability standard under
Title IX because a school district cannot be said to have a discriminatory intent unless it
has actual knowledge of the discrimination and fails to respond appropriately. See, e.g.,
Neiger, supra note 14, at 46-47. But there is no clear articulation of this argument in
Gebser, and it cannot be said that the majority is relying on the Title IX understanding of
discriminatory intent. Moreover, this argument would fail anyway, since Title VII also has
a discriminatory intent requirement for all disparate treatment (vs. disparate impact)
claims. See International Bd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
Since sexual harassment claims are disparate treatment claims under Title VII, they are
subject to the intent requirement, and this requirement therefore cannot be the basis for
distinguishing Title IX liability standards from those under Title VII.
48. 503 U.S. 60 (1992); see supra text accompanying note 13.
49. Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
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477 U.S. [at 64]. We believe the same rule should apply when a teacher
sexually harasses and abuses a student.50
III. THE DAVIS CASE: STUDENT/STUDENT SEXUAL HARASSMENT
In Davis, the Court determined the extent to which a school district may
be held liable in damages under Title IX for the sexual harassment of a stu-
dent when the perpetrator is another student rather than a teacher. In an-
other five to four decision, a different majority held that Title IX damages
liability for peer harassment is based upon the same actual notice and delib-
erate indifference standard that governs liability for teacher harassment
under Gebser:
We consider here whether the misconduct identified in Gebser - delib-
erate indifference to known acts of harassment - amounts to an inten-
tional violation of Title IX, capable of supporting a private damages
action, when the harasser is a student rather than a teacher. We con-
clude that, in certain limited circumstances, it does.51
In light of the arguments that had been made in the lower courts, and in
light of the Court's prior decision in Gebser, there were only two alternatives
available to the Davis court: (1) recognize a peer harassment cause of action
under Title IX parallel to the student/teacher cause of action recognized in
Gebser; or (2) reject any possible Title IX cause of action for peer harass-
ment. The Court was split between these two alternatives, and the former
prevailed by only one vote. Had there been a one-vote shift, there would
have been no judicial recourse at all under Title IX for students subjected to
peer harassment on school grounds during the school day, no matter how
severe the harassment and no matter how clear the knowledge of school
officials.
The Court took considerable pains to develop the "limited circumstances"
that must exist before a school district or other educational institution will be
liable for peer sexual harassment. First, the institution, the fund recipient,
must have "substantial control over both the harasser and the context in
which the known harassment occurs."'52 According to the Court, this require-
ment arises from a close reading of the statute's terms:
[Biecause the harassment must occur "under" "the operations of" a
funding recipient, see 20 U.S.C. §1681(a); §1687 (defining "program or
activity"), the harassment must take place in a context subject to the
school district's control....
Where, as here, the misconduct occurs during school hours and on
school grounds - the bulk of [the harasser's] misconduct, in fact, took
50. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 75 (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,
64 (1986)).
51. Davis, 526 U.S. at 643.
52. Id. at 645.
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place in the classroom - the misconduct is taking place "under" an
"operation" of the funding recipient. ... In these circumstances, the
recipient retains substantial control over the context in which the har-
assment occurs. More importantly, however, in this setting the Board
exercises significant control over the harasser. We have observed, for
example, "that the nature of [the State's] power [over public schoolchil-
dren] is custodial and tutelary, permitting a degree of supervision and
control that could not be exercised over free adults." 53
Second, the sexual harassment must be "severe, pervasive, and objectively
offensive" to a degree that "it denies its victims the equal access to education
that Title IX is designed to protect. '54 Thus:
[A] plaintiff must establish sexual harassment of students that is so se-
vere, pervasive, and objectively offensive, and that so undermines and
detracts from the victims' educational experience, that the victim-stu-
dents are effectively denied equal access to an institution's resources
and opportunities. (citation omitted)...
Moreover, the [statutory] provision that the discrimination occur
"under any education program or activity" suggests that the behavior
be serious enough to have the systemic effect of denying the victim
equal access to an educational program or activity. Although, in the-
ory, a single instance of sufficiently severe one-on-one peer harassment
could be said to have such an effect, we think it unlikely that Congress
would have thought such behavior sufficient to rise to this level in light
of the inevitability of student misconduct and the amount of litigation
that would be invited by entertaining claims of official indifference to a
single instance of one-on-one peer harassment. By limiting private
damages actions to cases having a systemic effect on educational pro-
grams or activities, we reconcile the general principle that Title IX pro-
hibits official indifference to known peer sexual harassment with the
practical realities of responding to student behavior, realities that Con-
gress could not have meant to be ignored.55
The Court consistently uses "and" rather than "or" as the connector be-
tween the phrases "severe, pervasive" and the phrase "objectively offensive,"
thus suggesting that actionable harassment must meet all three conditions.
The Court also underscores this point by noting that "a single instance of
sufficiently severe one-on-one peer harassment," standing alone, is unlikely
to meet the test. In contrast, the standard for Title VII cases is "severe or
pervasive. '56 The OCR's Sexual Harassment Guidance also uses the standard
''severe ... or pervasive" and makes clear that "a single or isolated incident
53. Id. at 645-46 (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655 (1995)).
54. Id. at 652.
55. Id. at 651-53.
56. See, e.g., Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 754 (1998).
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of sexual harassment may, if sufficiently severe, create a hostile
environment. '57
Speaking for the four dissenters in Davis, Justice Kennedy issued a sharply
worded and lengthy dissent. In somewhat overblown language, he empha-
sized the same legal policy considerations - primarily federalism considera-
tions - that influenced the Gebser majority to narrow the cause of action it
recognized:
The only certainty flowing from the majority's decision is that scarce
resources will be diverted from educating our children and that many
school districts, desperate to avoid Title IX peer harassment suits, will
adopt whatever federal code of student conduct and discipline the De-
partment of Education sees fit to impose upon them .... The Federal
Government will have insinuated itself not only into one of the most
traditional areas of state concern but also into one of the most sensitive
areas of human affairs. This federal control of the discipline of our Na-
tion's schoolchildren is contrary to our traditions and inconsistent with
the sensible administration of our schools....
... I can conceive of few interventions more intrusive upon the deli-
cate and vital relations between teacher and student, between student
and student, and between the State and its citizens than the one the
Court creates today by its own hand. Trusted principles of federalism
are superseded by a more contemporary imperative....
... Today's decision mandates to teachers instructing and supervising
their students the dubious assistance of federal court plaintiffs and their
lawyers and makes the federal courts the final arbiters of school policy
and of almost every disagreement between students. Enforcement of
the federal right recognized by the majority means that federal influ-
ence will permeate everything from curriculum decisions to day-to-day
classroom logistics and interactions. 58
The Davis majority, by highlighting the "limiting circumstances that shape
the private cause of action," and adding them to the requirements already
articulated in Gebser, creates a four-part standard for determining when an
educational institution would be liable in damages for peer sexual harass-
ment of another student. The four elements are: (1) The institution must
have "actual knowledge" of the harassment. (2) The institution must have
responded (or failed to respond) to the harassment with "deliberate indiffer-
ence," which the Davis Court defines as a response that is "clearly unreason-
able in light of the known circumstances." (3) The institution must have had
"substantial control" over the student harasser and the context of the harass-
ment. (4) The harassment must be "severe, pervasive, and objectively offen-
sive," and "systemic," to an extent that the victim of the harassment is
deprived of educational opportunities or services. This standard does not in-
57. Sexual Harassment Guidance, supra note 20, at 12,041.
58. Davis, 526 U.S. at 657-58, 685-86 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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clude one of the factors considered in Gebser: identifying the individuals
within the institution who must have received notice of the harassment and
determining whether this individual had authority to initiate corrective ac-
tion. There seems to be no reason, however, why such a factor would not
transfer from the teacher harassment to the peer harassment context. It may
be, however, that different or lower-level functionaries would be suitable re-
cipients of notice when a student rather than a teacher is the harasser or that
a more flexible understanding of "authority to initiate corrective action"
would pertain. Some such requirement will thus likely become a fifth ele-
ment of the Davis standard, insertable between elements (1) and (2) listed
above.
The Davis standard of liability, therefore, is based on the Gebser standard
but is not identical to it. The Court has included additional considerations in
the Davis analysis, most of which tend to make it more difficult for a harass-
ment victim to establish a claim of peer harassment than a claim of teacher
harassment. As the majority noted near the end of its Davis opinion:
The fact that it was a teacher who engaged in harassment in... Gebser
is relevant. The relationship between the harasser and the victim neces-
sarily affects the extent to which the misconduct can be said to breach
Title IX's guarantee of equal access to educational benefits and to have
a systemic effect on a program or activity. Peer harassment, in particu-
lar, is less likely to satisfy these requirements than is teacher-student
harassment. 59
IV. HIGHER EDUCATION VERSUS ELEMENTARY/SECONDARY EDUCATION
Although both Gebser and Davis are elementary/secondary education
cases, the statute being interpreted, Title IX, applies to all educational insti-
tutions receiving federal funds, elementary/secondary and higher education
alike. The Court makes no attempt in either case to limit the force of its
opinion to elementary/secondary education. It thus follows that the liability
standards crafted in these cases will apply to higher education cases as well,
but it does not follow that the standards will be applied in exactly the same
way, or with respect to the same considerations, at one level compared to the
other.
Elementary/secondary education and higher education differ substantially
from one another in structure and mission. The ages and maturity levels of
students can also vary dramatically from one level to the other, leading to
differences in perspective on questions about when conduct is sexual and
when sexual conduct is consensual. 6° Inevitably, therefore, there will be
some differences in the reasoning and results of the cases at the two levels,
especially with respect to peer harassment.
The Davis majority is quite clear on this point. By its emphasis on control,
it suggests that peer harassment claims will be even more difficult to establish
59. Id. at 653.
60. See, e.g., Sexual Harassment Guidance, supra note 20, at 12,040.
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in the higher education setting than in the elementary/secondary setting.
Any court that follows Davis must give close attention to this issue of control
since Davis indicates that institutional control over the harasser and the con-
text of the harassment is a key to liability. Although the Court's reasoning
about control is crafted to fit the elementary/secondary education context, as
indicated by its reference to the "custodial and tutelary" authority over "pub-
lic school children," the Court does acknowledge that the control element of
the liability standard "is sufficiently flexible to account ... for the level of
disciplinary authority available to the school. '61 Moreover, it pointedly as-
serts that "[a] university might not, for example, be expected to exercise the
same degree of control over its students" as would elementary schools. 62 It
should follow that colleges and universities, in general, will have less risk
exposure for peer harassment under Title IX because, in general, they exert
less control over students and over the educational environment than do ele-
mentary and secondary schools.
There is another potential difference in risk exposure between the two
levels of education, which, if recognized, would have critical consequences.
Public school boards for elementary/secondary education, as "political subdi-
visions" of the state, do not enjoy sovereign immunity from suit in federal
court; public colleges and universities, on the other hand, are usually "arms
of the state" sharing in the state's immunity.63 Moreover, under Seminole
Tribe of Florida v. Florida64 and later cases, public colleges and universities
are substantially protected from congressional attempts to abrogate their sov-
ereign immunity. 65
Thus far, however, the case law indicates that public institutions' sovereign
immunity claims are not likely to succeed under Title IX. In Crawford v.
Davis,66 for example, a university student had charged one of her instructors
with sexual harassment. Although the university discharged the instructor,
the student sued the university under Title IX. The university contended that
the Seminole Tribe decision prevented the court from hearing the student's
claim. The university asserted that Congress had no power under the spend-
ing clause to abrogate the university's immunity. The university argued that,
on the contrary, Title IX was within the scope of section five of the Four-
teenth Amendment, given the fact that the courts have often used the Four-
teenth Amendment's equal protection clause to proscribe gender
discrimination. The court was not concerned with whether Congress "had
the specific intent to legislate pursuant" to section five of the Fourteenth
Amendment, but only with whether Congress "could have enacted [Title IX]
pursuant to" section five. Since Congress therefore did have the power to
61. Davis, 526 U.S. at 649.
62. Id. at 649.
63. Kaplin & Lee, LHE 3d, supra note 8, § 2.3.3.; see also Kaplin & Lee, Supp. 2000,
supra note 6, § 2.3.3. In Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999), state sovereign immunity was
also extended to suits in state courts.
64. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
65. See Kaplin & Lee, Supp. 2000, supra note 6, § 7.1.5. Compare id. § 7.5.9.
66. 109 F.3d 1281 (8th Cir. 1997).
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abrogate, and since the Civil Rights Remedies Equalization Act of 198667
clearly indicates a congressional intent to abrogate, the court rejected the
university's Seminole Tribe defense.
Even if a court were to determine that Congress had not validly used its
section five power to abrogate state immunity under Title IX, it is likely that
sexual harassment suits against public institutions could proceed on an alter-
native basis. In Doe v. University of Illinois, 68 the court identified the alter-
native "that the University affirmatively waived its Eleventh Amendment
immunity by choosing to accept federal funds under Title IX." 69 The Doe
court did not rule on this waiver argument - a spending power argument -
because it determined that Congress had validly abrogated immunity under
its Fourteenth Amendment, section five, power. The U.S. Supreme Court,
however, has been receptive to the waiver argument,70 and some lower courts
have accepted it.71
V. A TYPOLOGY OF TiTLE IX SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASES
Using Gebser and Davis as the starting points, and examining these cases
in the context of other recent legal developments, it is now possible to con-
struct a typology of Title IX claims involving the sexual harassment of stu-
dents.72 Through this typology, various types of Title IX claims may be
i~lentified and compared. Insights on formulating and processing these
claims may also be drawn, and, for colleges and universities, suggestions on
preventing or resolving such claims may be developed.
The first step is to focus the typology clearly on Title IX, distinguishing all
other claims that could parallel or be confused with Title IX claims. Thus, we
must set aside all harassment claims that are brought under, or can only be
brought under, other sources of law - such as Section 1983, state tort law,
and Title VII.73 Prominent among these claims are individual or personal
liability claims against college or university officials, faculty members, or
other employees who are alleged to have harassed students or failed to pro-
tect them. It is now generally accepted that Title IX creates liability only for
the educational institution itself. Individual employees are not themselves
"education program[s] or activit[ies]," nor do they "receiv[e] Federal finan-
67. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 (1994).
68. 138 F.3d 653 (7th Cir. 1998), vacated and remanded, 526 U.S. 1142 (1999), rein-
stated in pertinent part, 200 F.3d 499 (7th Cir. 1999).
69. 138 F.3d at 660.
70. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238-40, 246-47 (1985); Alden,
527 U.S. at 267.
71. See, e.g., Litman v. George Mason Univ., 186 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 1999).
72. Claims involving sexual harassment of employees (for example, a supervisor's har-
assment of a teacher) are also within the scope of Title IX when they constitute employ-
ment discrimination based on sex. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982).
But such claims were not addressed in either Gebser or Davis. Moreover, it is unclear
whether the Title IX implied private cause of action for damages would extend to employ-
ment discrimination claims. See, e.g., Duello v. Univ. of Wis., 583 N.W. 2d 863 (Wis. Ct
App. 1998). See generally Kaplin & Lee, Supp. 2000, supra note 6, § 3.3.2.3.
73. See Part VIII, infra.
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cial assistance;" they are therefore outside the scope of Title IX.74 The Davis
majority opinion underscores this distinction between individual and institu-
tional liability when it focuses on the "recipient of federal education funding"
and emphasizes that the "[g]ovemment's enforcement power may only be
exercised against the funding recipient .... and we have not extended dam-
ages liability under title [sic] IX to parties outside the scope of this power. 75
The second step is to set aside harassment claims that do not allege harass-
ment that is based on or motivated by the victim's sex.76 Not every harass-
ment of a female by a male (or vice-versa) will connote different treatment
based on sex,77 and not every such harassment will have sexual connotations
or carry sexual implications.78 Thus, not all harassment of females by males
(or vice-versa) is sexual harassment covered by Title IX. Similarly, harass-
ment claims of gay persons may be based on the victim's sexual orientation
rather than being based on or motivated by the victim's gender as such. A
harasser or the harasser's institution, for instance, may treat male gay persons
the same as female gay persons but treat gay persons differently than heter-
osexuals, being motivated by the orientation and not the gender. Thus, sex-
ual orientation discrimination may not constitute different treatment based
on sex and thus may be outside the scope of Title IX.79 On the other hand, it
is now recognized that same-sex harassment falls within the scope of Title IX,
whether or not the victim is gay, when the victim can show that the harasser's
or the institution's actions were based on or motivated by the victim's sex. 80
Harassment claims based on characteristics other than sex - such as ra-
cial harassment or harassment based on disability - also fall outside the
bounds of Title IX and are therefore outside the bounds of the typology de-
veloped below. Such claims may be brought under other sources of law,
however, and may be resolved using principles similar to those applicable to
74. See, e.g., Soper v. Hoben, 195 F.3d 845 (6th Cir. 1999); Smith v. Metropolitan Sch.
Dist., 128 F.3d 1014 (7th Cir. 1997).
75. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 641(1999).
76. See generally Bernice Sandier & Robert Shoop, What is Sexual Harassment?, in
SEXUAL HARASSMENT ON CAMPUS: A GUIDE FOR ADMINISTRATORS, FACULTY, AND STU-
DENTS 1 (Bernice Sandler & Robert Shoop eds., 1997); Linda Vaden Gratch, Recognizing
Sexual Harassment, in SEXUAL HARASSMENT ON CAMPUS: A GUIDE FOR ADMINISTRA-
TORS, FACULTY, AND STUDENTS 278 (Bernice Sandler & Robert Shoop eds., 1997).
77. See, e.g., Gallant v. Board of Trustees of Cal. State Univ., 997 F. Supp. 1231 (N.D.
Cal. 1998).
78. See, e.g., Petrone v. Cleveland State Univ., 993 F. Supp. 1119, 1130 (N.D. Ohio
1998); see also Manfredi v. Mount Vernon Bd. of Educ., 94 F. Supp. 2d 447, 454-55
(S.D.N.Y. 2000).
79. See Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1996) (distinguishing between gen-
der discrimination and sexual orientation discrimination); compare United States v. Vir-
ginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (sex discrimination); see generally Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620
(1996) (sexual orientation).
80. See, e.g., H.M. v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 719 So. 2d 793 (Ala. 1998); Doe
v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 153 F.3d 211 (5th Cir. 1998); see generally Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998). See also Sexual Harassment Guidance, supra note
20 at 12,038-39.
2000]
632 JOURNAL OF COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY LAW
Title IX sexual harassment claims. 81 The typology below may therefore be
adaptable to these other types of harassment claims.
The third step is to set aside - temporarily - harassment claims that are
brought in administrative rather than judicial forums, or that seek injunctive
or declaratory relief rather than money damages. Both Gebser and Davis
were lawsuits alleging private causes of action for damages. The Court ad-
dressed liability questions only in that context.82 The typology begins, there-
fore, by addressing only Title IX harassment claims filed in court seeking
money damages. In Part VII below, the typology will expand to account for
differences in forum and remedy.
The fourth step is to set aside the occasional harassment claim alleging
that the harassment was a product of the institution's official policy or re-
sulted from some defect in the institution's official policy. In Gebser, the
Court stated that the Title IX liability standards it was crafting applied only
to "cases like this one that do not involve official policy of the recipient en-
tity."'83 If a complaint were to allege harassment based on the institution's
official policy (or, presumably, its customary practice), 84 apparently some lia-
bility standard other than Gebser-Davis would apply. Any such standard
would likely require only that the student plaintiffs demonstrate a causal link
between the alleged harassment and an institutional policy or custom.
After putting aside these various types of claims, the remaining types of
claims in the typology can be organized into six categories or types of Title
IX suits. Each category will be governed by Gebser and Davis but will be
analyzed somewhat differently from the other five categories. These are the
six pertinent categories:
(1) A student sues an educational institution for acts of a teacher who has
allegedly harassed the student. These types of claims will be decided using the
elements of the Gebser liability standard set out in Part II above.
(2) A student sues an educational institution for acts of a non-teacher staff
member who has allegedly harassed the student. These types of claims will
likely be decided using the elements of the Gebser liability standard, but
there could be difficult issues concerning whether the standard would be
81. See Racial Incidents and Harassment Against Students at Educational Institu-
tions; Investigative Guidance, 59 Fed. Reg. 11,448 (1994) (parallels the Department's sex-
ual harassment guidance in various respects); see, e.g., Gant v. Wallingford Bd. of Educ.,
195 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 1999) (disposing of a race discrimination claim using a principle of
"deliberate indifference").
82. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 277 (1998) ("The question in
this case is when a school district may be held liable in damages in an implied right of
action under Title IX . . ."); Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999)
("[Alt issue here is the question whether a recipient of federal education funding may be
liable for damages under Title IX . .
83. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290.
84. See, e.g., Alexander v. Yale Univ., 459 F. Supp. 1 (D. Conn. 1977).
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modified if the staff member does not have supervisory or other authority
over the student, as a teacher does. 85
(3) A student sues an educational institution for acts of an officer or admin-
istrator who has allegedly harassed the student. These types of claims will
likely be decided using the Gebser standard, along with the caveat in category
(2) above concerning supervisory authority, but application of the standard
will become more complicated when a high-level officer or administrator is
alleged to be the perpetrator. In particular, there may be difficulties deter-
mining who, within the institution, would have authority to receive notice of
such harassment and be authorized to initiate corrective action. Moreover, in
some extreme circumstances, harassment by high-level officials could be con-
sidered to be part of the institution's "official policy," and institutional liabil-
ity may be based on the policy itself rather than on the elements of the
Gebser standard.86
(4) A student sues an educational institution for acts of other students who
allegedly harassed the student. The Davis standard, a combination of the
Gebser standard and the additional elements that Davis added to the Gebser
standard, will govern this type of claim. Presumably the second element of
the Gebser standard, authority to take corrective action, will apply in a more
expansive way to peer harassment claims.
(5) A student sues an educational institution for acts of other students who
have allegedly harassed the student (as in category (4) above), but the student
perpetrators have some authority over the student victim akin to that which a
teacher, staff member, or administrator might have. Such situations might
arise, for instance, in an ROTC program, or military school, or in academic
programs that use graduate students as teaching or lab assistants. This type
of case would likely be decided under the Gebser standard or under a modi-
fied version of Davis that gives relatively more emphasis to the first two ele-
ments and relatively less emphasis to the latter two elements. In Morse v.
Regents of the University of Colorado,87 for instance, female ROTC cadets
who were allegedly harassed by a higher-ranking male cadet brought a Title
IX claim against the university. The court held that the female cadets had
stated a valid Title IX claim under the Gebser standards, which applied be-
cause "a fellow student acting with authority bestowed by" a "University-
sanctioned program" was the alleged harasser.88
(6) A student sues an educational institution for acts of a third party who
has allegedly harassed the student. The third party might be a staff member at
a clinical or field placement, 89 a student from another school who is in an
85. This kind of distinction between supervisory and non-supervisory employees is
drawn in Title VII cases. See, e.g., Farragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 792-801
(1998).
86. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
87. 154 F.3d 1124 (10th Cir. 1998).
88. Id.
89. See, e.g., Petrone v. Cleveland State Univ., 993 F. Supp. 1119 (N.D. Ohio 1998).
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externship program with the alleged victim, a patient in a clinic to which the
student is assigned, 90 a visitor to the campus,91 or even a stranger who comes
onto the campus.92 There would be a threshold issue whether the "program
or activity" in which the harassment occurred is an "education program or
activity" of the institution being sued.93 If it is, and Title IX therefore ap-
plies, 94 the applicable standard of liability should depend on whether the har-
asser's relationship with the institution and victim is like that of a teacher/
staffer (in which case some form of the Gebser standard should apply), is like
that of a student (in which case some form of the Davis standard should
apply), or is more remote than these relationships (in which case it is ques-
tionable whether there would be any institutional liability at all).
VI. HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT HARASSMENT VS.
QUID PRO Quo HARASSMENT
The typology in Part V does not take into account the commonly drawn
distinction between hostile environment harassment and quid pro quo har-
assment. It does not, for instance, subdivide the first three categories into
separate types of claims for each of the two types of harassment. Yet the
OCR's Sexual Harassment Guidance makes this distinction, 95 and courts in
Title IX cases have often done so both before and after Gebser and Davis.
96
In recent years, however, courts have been relying less on the quid pro
quo/hostile environment distinction, and that distinction has begun to have
less control over the results in specific cases.97 OCR's Sexual Harassment
Guidance also acknowledges that "in many cases the line between quid pro
quo and hostile environment discrimination will be blurred. 98 Moreover, in
Gebser and Davis, the U.S. Supreme Court did not address the distinction
between quid pro quo harassment and hostile environment harassment. The
Gebser and Davis liability standards clearly apply to hostile environment
claims, but it is not entirely clear whether they apply in the same way to quid
90. See Murray v. New York Univ. College of Dentistry, 57 F.3d 243 (2d Cir. 1995)
(pre-Gebser case that uses a different standard of liability but considers similar
circumstances).
91. See Sexual Harassment Guidance, supra note 20 at 12,040 (containing a section on
third party harassment that "a visiting speaker or members of a visiting athletic club" as an
example of third parties whose actions can sometimes result in institutional liability under
Title IX).
92. Compare Martin v. Howard Univ., No. 99-1175 (TFH), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
19516 (D.D.C. Dec. 15, 1999).
93. See Title IX, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681(a) & 1687; see generally Kaplin & Lee, Supp. 2000,
supra note 6, § 7.5.7.4.
94. See, e.g., Crandell v. New York College of Osteopathic Med., 87 F. Supp. 2d 304,
316-17 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
95. See Sexual Harassment Guidance, supra note 20 at 12,038-39.
96. See, e.g., Wills v. Brown Univ., 184 F.3d 20, 25-26 (1st Cir. 1999); Crandell, 87 F.
Supp. 2d 304, 314-21 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
97. See Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 753-54 (1998); Liu v. Striuli, 36 F.
Supp. 2d 452, 464-65 (D.R.I. 1999).
98. Sexual Harassment Guidance, supra note 20, at 12,039.
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pro quo harassment - or, as courts increasingly put it, to harassment that
involves a "tangible" adverse action against the victim.99
This issue was squarely presented in Liu v. Striuli.1'0 Liu, a female gradu-
ate student, brought'a Title IX claim against her college based on her alleged
harassment by a professor. The college argued that the plaintiff's case did
not meet the Gebser liability standards. The plaintiff, characterizing the har-
assment as being in the quid pro quo category, argued that the Gebser stan-
dard did not apply to this type of claim:
[Liu] posits that vicarious liability should be imposed on an employer
automatically if the plaintiff can prove a case of quid pro quo harass-
ment .... Liu maintains that Gebser did not affect this rule because in
that case the Court addressed only hostile environment claims, while
her allegation is based on quid pro quo harassment. Therefore, she ar-
gues, a holding of vicarious liability against the College is compelled by
resort to the rules commonly applied to quid pro quo harassment
cases.101
Citing several earlier cases, the court flatly rejected Liu's argument:
The gaping hole in plaintiff's argument ... is that the Gebser opinion
makes no distinction between the two types of sexual harassment claims
in the Title IX context. In fact, neither term is mentioned in the opin-
ion. The Court's broad language ... applies to both types of harass-
ment in Title IX cases (citation omitted). This conclusion has been
reached by several federal courts that have ruled on Title IX sexual
harassment claims since the Court issued the Gebser decision (citations
omitted). Liu has failed to cite, and this Court has been unable to iden-
tify, any case holding to the contrary. 10 2
Thus far, therefore, courts have provided a negative answer to the ques-
tion whether different liability standards apply to quid pro quo claims under
Title IX. The typology above, therefore, does not account for any such dif-
ference. The Liu court perhaps read too much into the Gebser opinion's si-
lence on the hostile environment/quid pro quo distinction, and most lower
courts have yet to rule on this point. At least in situations of a teacher's or
administrator's quid pro quo harassment of a student, where the opportunity
for and effectiveness of such harassment is so dependent on the perpetrator's
official duties and consequent power over students, good legal and policy
arguments could be made for a separate liability standard. Any such stan-
dard would increase the school's or college's potential liability beyond what it
is under the Gebser standard, in recognition of the increased significance of
99. See, e.g., Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998).
100. 36 F. Supp. 2d 452 (1999).
101. Id. at 465.
102. Id. (citing Gebser, 524 U.S. at 289; Morse v. Regents of the Univ. of Colo., 154
F.3d 1124, 1127 (10th Cir. 1998). See also Klemencic v. Ohio State Univ., 10 F. Supp. 2d
911, 918-21 (S.D. Ohio 1998); Burtner v. Hiram College, 9 F. Supp. 2d 852, 856 (N.D. Ohio
1998)).
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the perpetrator's official power. Until the courts have ruled more defini-
tively on this point, some room should be left in the typology for a possible
subdivision of categories one to three, and possibly five,'10 3 into hostile envi-
ronment claims and quid pro quo claims.
VII. THE EFFECTS OF CHOICE OF REMEDY AND DIsPuTE-RESOLUTION
FORUM ON TITLE IX LIABILITY STANDARDS
There are three basic ways in which student victims of harassment may
assert Title IX sexual harassment claims against the institution: (1) by suing
the institution in court and seeking money damages; (2) by suing the institu-
tion in court and seeking injunctive or declaratory relief; and (3) by filing an
administrative complaint, in lieu of or in addition to suit, against the institu-
tion through an internal grievance system or with the U.S. Department of
Education, seeking administrative compliance. The Gebser-Davis liability
standards apply with certainty only to the first of these three enforcement
avenues, and the typology in Part V focuses only on this first enforcement
avenue.1° 4 The typology can now be expanded to include the other two ave-
nues. Each of the six categories of claims outlined in the typology can be
further divided into three subcategories: judicial claims for money damages
((1) above); judicial claims for injunctive and/or declaratory relief ((2)
above); and administrative claims for fund-termination or other compliance
remedies ((3) above). Thus, for example, the first category in the typology -
claims based on harassment by a teacher - can be subdivided into: (1) the
student's judicial claims against the institution for monetary damages, (2) the
student's judicial claims against the institution for injunctive and/or declara-
tory relief, and (3) the student's administrative claims against the institution.
The same can be done with each of the other five types of claims in the
typology, resulting in a typology of eighteen categories. A graphic of this
typology is set out below as an illustration.
Across the three avenues of enforcement, and the eighteen categories of
claims, the standards of liability will vary depending on both the type of claim
filed (Part V) and the type of enforcement selected (this Part). The following
summary focuses primarily on the latter variable.
(1) Judicial claims for damages. Either the Gebser or the Davis liability
standard (or, in some cases, a combination of the two) will apply. As devel-
oped in Parts IV and V, above, the exact elements of the standard and the
nuances of its application will vary depending upon the identity of the alleged
harasser, and also upon whether the case is an elementary/secondary case or
a higher education case.
(2) Judicial claims for injunctive and/or declaratory relief. Title IX private
causes of action for injunctive and declaratory relief are authorized by Can-
103. Category five in the typology may merit this subdivision if the student perpetra-
tor's authority over the student victim creates the opportunity for, and supports the effec-
tiveness of, quid pro quo harassment.
104. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
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non v. University of Chicago.10 5 Since money damages are not sought, this
type of claim is apparently not directly governed by the Gebser and Davis
cases - whose factual context is limited to monetary liability and whose legal
rationale seems largely dependent on the negative impact of monetary dam-
age awards upon educational institutions.1° 6 It is therefore not clear what
liability standard would apply to a Title IX harassment claim against an insti-
tution seeking only injunctive or declaratory relief. Although Gebser and
Davis establish that subjection to harassment can constitute discrimination
under Title IX, and that the institution can be liable when it exercises suffi-
cient control over the harasser and the context, the Court's actual notice and
deliberate indifference requirements are likely too stringent for institutional
liability for injunctive and declaratory relief. Even if the actual knowledge
standard did apply, it would apparently be easily met, since injunctive relief is
generally prospective and the educational institution would therefore have
actual notice and time to respond to the problem and voluntarily comply with
the law before it was bound by the court order.
(3) Administrative claims. The third enforcement avenue - the adminis-
trative complaint seeking administrative relief - is expressly provided by the
Title IX statute and regulations. The alleged victim may initiate a grievance
under the institution's own grievance process, 10 7 or may complain to the U.S.
Department of Education and ask for an investigation and for a compliance
agreement with the institution or a fund cut-off.'l 8 For these processes, the
U.S. Department of Education is apparently free to prescribe standards of
institutional liability that differ from the Gebser-Davis standards, so long as
the Department's own standards are consistent with the basic nondiscrimina-
tion prohibitions in the Title IX statute.
Since the institution would always receive notice of its non-compliance
and the opportunity to make appropriate adjustments before any administra-
tive penalty is imposed, and since an administrative proceeding would not
result in a monetary damages award against the institution, 0 9 it appears that
the U.S. Department of Education may continue to apply its own Sexual
Harassment Guidance'1 0 to administrative complaints, compliance investiga-
tions, and fund cut-off hearings. Indeed, in the aftermath of Gebser, the U.S.
Secretary of Education issued a statement to this effect.11'
105. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
106. See supra Parts II-III.
107. 34 C.F.R. §§ 106.8(b), 106.9 (1999). See also Sexual Harassment Guidance, supra
note 20, at 12,044-45.
108. See 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1994); 34 C.F.R. § 106.71 (1999).
109. See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 289.
110. See Sexual Harassment Guidance, supra note 20.
111. Statement by U.S. Secretary of Education Richard W. Riley: On the Impact on Title
IX of the U.S. Supreme Court's Gebser v. Lago Vista Decision, available at http://www.ed.
gov/pressreleases/07-1998/lago.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2000).
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VIII. CONTRASTING TYPES OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT CLAIMS IN
HIGHER EDUCATION
The typology of student Title IX claims developed in Parts V and VII
above can be better understood by distinguishing these claims from, and re-
lating them to, other types of sexual harassment claims that arise in the
higher education context. There are two broad categories of these contrast-
ing claims to consider: (1) claims that students bring against institutions using
sources of law other than Title IX in order to avoid the minimalist institu-
tional liability standards of Gebser and Davis; and (2) claims that students
bring against individual teachers, staff members, administrators, students, or
third parties, using sources of law other than Title IX, to avoid Title IX's lack
of individual liability.112
Probably the most likely claims to fall into these contrasting categories are
§ 1983 claims,113 which are used to assert the harassment victim's rights under
the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause.114 Unlike Title IX
claims, § 1983 claims may be brought only against public institutions and
their employees. Also unlike Title IX, § 1983 claims are frequently brought
against the individuals who were involved in the harassment or the failure to
protect the student from it. While such claims are impermissible under Title
IX, they may proceed under § 1983 so long as the individual does not have a
qualified immunity from suit.115 In Oona v. McCaffrey,116 for instance, a stu-
dent who was allegedly harassed by a student teacher used § 1983 to sue
school officials who were allegedly responsible for permitting the harass-
ment. The court held that the student had stated a valid equal protection
claim for gender discrimination and rejected the officials' qualified immunity
defense.
Section 1983 harassment claims against public higher education institu-
tions seldom succeed because the institution is usually immune from suit as
an "arm of the state. 1 17 Even if the institution can be sued, a § 1983 claim
against it can succeed only if the challenged actions were taken pursuant to
an established institutional policy or custom. In Murrell v. School District
No. 1,118 for instance, a mother filed a § 1983 claim on her daughter's behalf
against a school district, alleging that the district's failure to protect her
daughter from a fellow student's sexual assaults violated the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. The court rejected the mother's claim because she did not allege
that the school district was acting pursuant to an official policy or custom.
112. See supra Part V.
113. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994 & Supp. 1998). See Laura Oren, Section 1983 and Sex
Abuse in Schools: Making a Federal Case Out of It, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 747 (1997); and
see generally KAPLIN & LEE, LHE 3d, supra note 8, §§ 2.3.3 & 2.4.3.
114. See, e.g., Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1996).
115. See generally KAPLIN & LEE, LHE 3d, supra note 8, § 2.4.3, and KAPLIN & LEE,
Supp. 2000., supra note 6, § 2.4.3.
116. 143 F.3d 473 (9th Cir. 1998).
117. See supra note 63 and accompanying text; see also KAPLIN & LEE, Supp. 2000.,
supra note 6, § 2.3.3.
118. 186 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 1999).
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When courts do reach the merits of a § 1983 harassment claim, there is an
emerging tendency, in the aftermath of Gebser and Davis, for them to use a
"deliberate indifference" standard of liability similar to that in the Title IX
cases.119
Students may also use state tort and contract law to bring harassment
claims against both institutions and individual employees. Public or private
institutions and individuals may be sued, but public institutions and their offi-
cials will sometimes be immune from suit. The types of claims that could
cover harassment include breach of contract, intentional or negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress, assault, battery, negligent hiring, negligent supervi-
sion, and negligent retention. In Chontos v. Rhea,1 20 for example, the court
allowed a student to proceed with a negligent retention claim against a uni-
versity based on the university's awareness of a professor's prior harassment
of students. In contrast, in Wills v. Brown University,121 the court determined
that a student complaining of a professor's harassment had not established
viable claims of intentional infliction or negligent hiring against the
university.
A third and narrower type of contrasting claim is the Title VII employ-
ment discrimination claim brought by a student who is also an employee of
the institution. Students bring these claims against the institution as the em-
ployer. These claims would have the advantage of the Title VII liability stan-
dards that are more favorable to plaintiffs than the Title IX standards.1 22 In
Karibian v. Columbia University,123 for example, the plaintiff was a student at
Columbia who was also employed by Columbia in its fund-raising office.
Since the plaintiff was harassed in her role as employee rather than her role
as student, the case proceeded as a Title VII case. In addition, in Crandell v.
New York College of Osteopathic Medicine,124 the court ruled that a sexual
harassment complainant's position, a paid post-graduate internship, consti-
tuted employment rather than participation in an "educational program or
activity." The claim therefore fit within Title VII rather than Title IX.
IX. RAMIFICATIONS OF GEBSER AND DAVIS
By separating Title IX from Title VII, the Gebser case increases the need
for definitions of sexual harassment and guidelines applicable to Title IX.
Prior to Gebser, the legal standards for harassment had been defined and
developed primarily under Title VII, and courts in Title IX cases often relied
on Title VII precedents.'25 Now that Title VII precedents and guidelines are
119. See e.g., Murrell v. School Dist. No. 1, 186 F.3d 1238, 1249-51. See also Gant v.
Wallingford Bd. of Educ., 195 F.3d 134, 140-46 (2d Cir. 1999) (racial harassment).
120. 29 F. Supp. 2d 931 (N.D. Ind. 1998).
121. 184 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 1999).
122. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
123. 14 F.3d 773 (2d Cir. 1994).
124. 87 F. Supp. 2d 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). See also O'Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112 (2d
Cir. 1997) (distinguishing between students' Title VII claims and students' Title IX claims).
125. See, e.g., Murray v. New York Univ. College of Dentistry, 57 F.3d 243 (2d Cir.
1995).
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no longer persuasive under Title IX, at least for private causes of action for
damages, there is a need for more legal guidance developed specifically to fit
the Title IX educational context. It would be beneficial for the U.S. Depart-
ment of Education, the courts, and individual institutions to move ahead to
fill this need 126 with guidelines sensitive to differences between the education
environment and the work environment,'12 7 to differences between elemen-
tary/secondary education and higher education, 128 and to the differences
among types of claims suggested by the typology in Parts V and VII above.
In developing guidelines for determining what harassment is and when it
has occurred, it is likely that courts will develop different guidelines (and
standards of liability) than administrative agencies and individual institutions.
The Gebser case has already determined that, on the question of monetary
liability, the Court's own standards will prevail in court. But it is open to the
Department of Education and individual institutions to maintain different
standards than the courts for use in administrative processes.
It is imperative, however, that in developing sexual harassment policies,
institutions avoid a fixation on the legal aspects of sexual harassment. There
is a danger, exacerbated by Gebser and Davis, that the emphasis on the law
of sexual harassment will divert institutions from important educational pol-
icy issues and ethical issues concerning harassment. If an educational institu-
tion were to focus predominantly on the minimalist Gebser and Davis
liability standards and on the easiest or surest ways to avoid liability under
these standards, the institution could miss many opportunities for developing
a supportive learning environment and implementing good educational pol-
icy on teacher-student and student-student relationships. As with other con-
temporary issues of law and policy, avoiding liability should seldom be the
highest value. Educational institutions should stand ready to do more for the
members of their academic communities than the law requires, when it serves
the institutional mission to do so. To operate in this fashion, institutions will
need administrators and legal counsel with clear understandings of the inter-
relationships between law and policy and with strong wills to work together
as a team to accomplish policy objectives within the context of legal
constraints. 29
Thus, the Gebser-Davis liability standards should become a floor for insti-
tutions and not a ceiling. What is built upon this legal floor need not be
solely, or even primarily, rules, adversary hearings, and punishments. Nor
should there be primarily open space above the floor, indicating a hands-off
approach. Rather, educational programming, ethical development program-
ming, alternative dispute resolution techniques, and other policy initiatives
126. The Department of Education has already made a contribution through its Sexual
Harassment Guidance, supra note 20, which remains a valuable guideline for OCR investi-
gations and compliance proceedings and for investigations and grievance proceedings
within individual institutions.
127. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
128. See supra Part IV.
129. See KAPLIN & LEE, LHE 3d, supra note 8, §§ 1.7.2 & 1.4.6.
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should be a prominent part of the structure.1 30 The next part of this Article
(Part X) provides some practical examples of what might be included. While
the floor/ceiling model calls for colleges and universities to be proactive, it is
a far, far cry from a return to in loco parentis. Instead of asking college and
universities to be parents, this model calls on them to be "preventive plan-
ning" institutions, 131 or perhaps "facilitator" institutions. 32
X. IMPLEMENTING GEBSER AND DAVIS ON CAMPUS
Part IX above has already suggested that institutions may and should de-
velop much of their student sexual harassment policy apart from the stan-
dards of Gebser and Davis. In this light, colleges and universities should
review all of their harassment policies concerning students. Among other
things, an institution should consider whether its student harassment policies
are sufficiently distinct from its employee harassment policies; whether its
delegations of authority for reporting, investigating, and correcting sexual
harassment of students are sufficiently articulated; whether students are
clearly and periodically apprised of what sexual harassment is and to whom it
can be reported; and whether the institution has investigation procedures 133
and dispute-resolution procedures 34 that are in place and working
effectively.
Institutions should strive to manage harassment problems in a multi-fac-
eted manner that addresses both legal and policy considerations. There
should be ample room for non-adjudicative and non-adversarial means of
managing conflict. In this sensitive realm of harassment, sex, and gender re-
lationships, ethical and educational standards are as important as legal stan-
dards in guiding institutional planning, 35 and non-legal solutions to campus
problems can be as viable as legal solutions. This is especially true for peer
harassment (versus faculty harassment), which often presents itself in shades
of gray rather than in black and white.
As institutions consider their options, they should avoid being enticed by
speech codes as a means for reducing the risks of Gebser-Davis liability. In
his dissent in Davis, Justice Kennedy predicted that: "[a]t the college level,
the majority's holding is sure to add fuel to the debate over campus speech
codes that, in the name of preventing a hostile educational environment, may
130. See, e.g., Student Ethical Development: Part I, 10 SYNTHESIS: L. AND POL'Y IN
HIGHER EDUC. 753 (1999).
131. KAPLIN & LEE, LHE 3d, supra note 8, § 1.7.2.
132. ROBERT BICKEL & PETER LAKE, THE RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE
MODERN UNIVERSITY: WHO ASSUMES THE RISKS OF COLLEGE LIFE? (1999).
133. See, e.g., Jack Burtch, Risks in Interviewing the Sexual Harassment Client, 19 AM.
J. OF TRIAL ADvoc. 563 (1996); SUSAN ERLICH, The Investigation Process, in SEXUAL
HARASSMENT ON CAMPUS: A GUIDE FOR ADMINISTRATORS, FACULTY, AND STUDENTS
163 (Bernice Sandier & Robert Shoop, eds., 1997).
134. See, e.g., Mary P. Rowe, An Effective Integrated Complaint Resolution System 186,
in SEXUAL HARASSMENT ON CAMPUS: A GUIDE FOR ADMINISTRATORS, FACULTY, AND
STUDENTS (Bernice Sandler & Robert Shoop, eds., 1997; Howard Gadlin, Mediating Sexual
Harassment 202, in id.)
135. See, e.g., Gary Pavela, Civility and Student Life, 27 STETSON L. REv. 161 (1997).
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infringe students' First Amendment rights. ' 136 Institutions should resist the
temptation to re-travel this road. Now, as before, speech codes would en-
counter serious First Amendment difficulties, as Justice Kennedy suggests,
and would still have quite limited efficacy. 137 Better than speech codes, by
far, would be responses such as mediation programs; education programs for
students, faculty, and staff; counseling services for students; the development
of clearer internal guidelines on sexual harassment (with examples); 138 and
the use of grievance procedures. 139 Through such institutional responses, in-
stitutions can make considerable progress in discouraging sexual harassment
problems from arising, in informally and internally handling those that do
arise, and in constructing suitable defenses should judicial claims be filed.
Once again, good teamwork between administrators and college counsel is a
key to effectuating these preventive planning initiatives.14 °
XI. CONCLUSION
Franklin, Gebser, and Davis have substantially clarified the Title IX law
regarding sexual harassment of students, but these cases have also estab-
lished new distinctions and complexities with which to grapple. Since Title
VII precedents are no longer a primary guidepost for Title IX law, educa-
tional institutions must distinguish more sharply between the two bodies of
law and can no longer comfortably fall back on an established body of Title
VII law to help resolve Title IX complexities. This article, and the typology
of Title IX claims that it develops, provides a road map of this new Title IX
terrain and will assist both higher educational institutions and victimized stu-
dents, and their counsel, to perceive the new distinctions and to manage the
new legal and policy complexities spawned by the Gebser and Davis
decisions.
136. 526 U.S. at 682 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also 526 U.S. at 668 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
137. See KAPLIN & LEE, LHE 3d, supra note 8, § 4.10; KAPLIN & LEE, Supp. 2000,
supra note 6, § 4.10.
138. Specific provisions on harassment may also be placed in the student conduct code,
so long as the institution is careful to avoid First Amendment issues. See Sax v. State
College Area Sch. Dist., 77 F. Supp. 2d 621 (M.D. Pa. 1999) (upholding school district's
"Anti-Harassment Policy" as regulation of conduct, not speech). Compare Dambrot v.
Central Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d 1177 (6th Cir. 1995) (invalidating college's "discriminatory
harassment policy" as an overbroad and vague regulation of speech).
139. See, e.g., JUDITH BRANDENBURG, CONFRONTING SEXUAL HARASSMENT: WHAT
SCHOOLS AND COLLEGES CAN Do 49-82 (1997); Susan Hippensteele & Thomas C. Pear-
son, Responding Effectively to Sexual Harassment: Victim Advocacy, Early Intervention,
and Problem Solving, CHANGE, Jan.-Feb. 1999, at 48; Campus Interventions for Effectively
Dealing with Sexual Harassment, in SEXUAL HARASSMENT ON COLLEGE CAMPUSES:
ABUSING THE IVORY POWER (Michelle A. Paludi, ed., 2d ed. 1996); SEXUAL HARASSMENT
ON CAMPUS: A GUIDE FOR ADMINISTRATORS, FACULTY, AND STUDENTS (Bernice Sandler
& Robert Shoop, eds., 1997).
140. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
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